“Impossible to Simply Continue Along Previous Lines: Changing Life in Times of Crisis”
One-day workshop before the 4S conference, Boston, Tues 29th August 2017
Overview of Notes on Enactable Social Theorizing assembled in 2012, followed by key points of each of the notes. Comments welcome to help nudge me to revise and develop the notes. Continue reading
On the presumption that the dynamic flux of ecological and social complexities cannot be well understood from an outside view…
Difficulties identifying causally relevant genetic variants underlying patterns of human variation have been given competing interpretations. The debate is illuminated in this article by drawing attention to the issue of underlying heterogeneity—the possibility that genetic and environmental factors or entities underlying a trait are heterogeneous—as well as four other fundamental gaps in the methods and interpretation of classical quantitative genetics:
Social epidemiologist Davey Smith (2011) argues that epidemiologists should accept a gloomy prospect: considerable randomness at the individual level means that they should keep their focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level. The difficulty epidemiology has had in moving from significant population-level risk factors to improved prediction of cases at an individual level is analogous to the lack of success in the search for systematic aspects of the non-shared environmental influences that human quantitative genetics claims overshadow common environmental influences (e.g., the family’s socioeconomic status which siblings have in common). This article responds to the argument and analogy, aiming to draw three audiences—social epidemiologists, human quantitative geneticists, and philosophers of science—into a shared discussion that centers not on randomness, but on heterogeneity in various forms.
Although stable systems may be extremely rare as a fraction of the complex ecological systems being sampled (as shown in the 1970s theoretical work of Robert May), they can be readily constructed over time by the addition of populations from a pool of populations or by elimination of populations from systems not at a steady state. The implications of such a constructionist perspective could challenge not only ecologists, but also theorists in all fields that make use of models without a process of construction over time of the complexity of the situation studied.
A paper to appear in the journal Ecological Complexity centers not so much on advancing this perspective, but on two consequent puzzles:
A revised entry on the genotype-phenotype distinction has been published by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A major difficulty we had preparing this revision followed once it was noted that philosophers write on the genotype-phenotype relationship, not on the genotype-phenotype distinction. Continue reading