Abstract of a manuscript (updated 3 Dec 18). Comments welcome—email me for the full draft.
Participants in debates about developments in science and technology point to issues overlooked or downplayed by scientists—or, if the debate is among scientists themselves, by other scientists. Sometimes included among participants in debates are interpreters of science—sociologists, historians, philosophers, and scholars from other fields of Science and Technology Studies. Taking these scholars as the audience, this article asks what should we do if we identify a significant issue not yet subject to debate?
Taylor, P. J. “Critical Epidemiological Literacy: Understanding Ideas Better When Placed in Relation to Alternatives,” Synthese, in press, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01960-6.
I just completed an article that describes contrasting ideas for a sequence of topics as presented to students in a graduate course on epidemiological literacy. Because it could be the first draft of something more developed, I share the abstract and invite feedback.
A revised entry on the genotype-phenotype distinction has been published by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A major difficulty we had preparing this revision followed once it was noted that philosophers write on the genotype-phenotype relationship, not on the genotype-phenotype distinction. Continue reading
The Social Construction of What? (Harvard UP, 2000) by philosopher of science, Ian Hacking, critically reviews the possible meanings of social construction in the context of scientific knowledge and technology. However, there is one meaning of construction that he does not consider, perhaps the most obvious one to the common person, namely, the process of building a structure from diverse materials, as in the foundations, frames, walls, roof, plumbing and electrical circuits, and so on. (2011 post)
A 1975 book of Hacking’s, What does language matter to philosophy?, almost allows us to see what he overlooked at that time and still did in the 2000 book, namely, that knowing always involves engaging [*] or acting as if the world were like our explicit and implicit theories and representations of it. Continue reading
Abstract of updated article to appear in Encyclopedia of the Life Sciences,
Although philosophy of ecology was slow to become established as an area of formal philosophical interest, there is a rich history of developing and debating conceptual frameworks in ecological and environmental science. A key challenge in conceptualising ecological complexity is to allow simultaneously for particularity, contingency and structure – structure, moreover, that changes, is internally differentiated, and has problematic boundaries. In contrast to ambitions of earlier decades for identifying general principles about systems and communities, ecologists now widely assert historical contingency, nonequilibrium formulations, local context and individual detail. Given that all organisms – humans included – live in dynamic ecological contexts, philosophy of ecology raises more general questions about conceptualising the positionality of humans and other organisms in the dynamic flux of their intersecting worlds.
A set of episodes or angles on how I might teach “Foundations of Philosophical Thought,” relayed as a 54-minute video given that I won’t have time to write up the thoughts I had during a walk this morning: http://youtu.be/G5MnPXZSi0E
(Comments welcome, including pointing out all the articulate writers [philosophers included] who have dealt with issues I raise and those I overlook or brush past.)